ABSTRACT The establishment of convenient and reliable cryptographic keys is not always feasible, especially in low-powered wireless devices where a complex key management infrastructure is unaffordable. Physical layer-based key generation approaches, on the other hand, allow two legitimate users to establish a common secret key by exploiting the parameters of the wireless channel, such as the underlying impulse response. In this paper, a fundamental bound on the maximum achievable key generation rate (KGR) over wireless fading channels with asymmetric additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is derived. A Nakagamim fading channel is considered, and the effect of non-reciprocity on the forward and reverse channels correlation is demonstrated. We validate the theoretical platform through simulations using a key generation protocol based on the level crossing rate (LCR) of the fading process. The proposed LCR protocol models the Nakagami channel by utilizing the sum-of-sinusoids approach, where Doppler shift, fading severity, and number-of-paths are taken into account. The proposed protocol also incorporates a two-level quantizer to extract keys, where the channel estimates between a wireless transmitter and receiver can be used as the basis. Besides providing an upper bound on the KGR, the analytical and simulation results intertwine the effect of channel reciprocity with the key generation process.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever-growing demand for designing intelligent wireless devices and network protocols to alleviate the impact of eavesdropping has been a recent major challenge [1] - [3] . Numerous encryption techniques were proposed to tackle the problematic attacks launched by adversaries aiming to sniff and/or alter active communications among two or more legitimate users. Such attacks endanger information integrity and increase network vulnerability. The most predominant yet computationally expensive approaches are the one-key (i.e., Data Encryption Standard (DES)) [4] and two-key public key cryptography (PKC) [5] . Nevertheless, such techniques require secret key distribution and protection; needless to mention the significance overhead that results in an added mention the significant overhead that results in an added energy consumption. Quantum cryptography eliminates the dependence on public keys at the expense of cost [6] - [8] .
On the other hand, information-theoretic or physical layer security (PLS) uses the physical properties of the wireless channel to establish a higher level of security. Although information-theoretic security is often used interchangeably with PLS, the former addresses security performance under certain strict conditions (e.g., long key lengths as Shannon suggested in [9] ). While with PLS, the practical aspect is of a greater significance as the security problem is investigated from the system design viewpoint. PLS techniques try to provide the best effort information secrecy through utilizing the unpredictable and time-varying channel random characteristics along with signal processing techniques. The first work that addressed the practical aspect of informationtheoretic secrecy was presented by Wyner [10] . Unlike what Shannon presented in [9] , where it was assumed that the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper observe the same channel conditions, Wyner relaxed such assumption. Wyner suggested that the partial or total stochastic independence of the main channel (from Alice to Bob) and the wiretapper channel (from Alice to Eve) can be exploited to introduce perfect secrecy. In other words, the inherent noise in the main channel is independent of that in the wiretapper channel, which is a more reasonable assumption due to the stochastic nature of many communication channels. Based on the wiretap model, carefully designed error-control codes have been shown to provide a level of information-theoretic secrecy without the need for shared secret keys, by which the amount of information leaked to a wiretapper may be controlled. Accordingly, the use of error-control codes has been the core to develop PLS research [11] , [12] , and references therein.
Another import direction in PLS research is the generation of secret keys from wireless channel measurements. Two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, generate keys at each end from a set of common channel parameters [13] , [14] . Consequently, no key distribution platform is required, presenting an alternative to PKC. Since mobility and the associated fading result in a spatial uncorrelation (i.e., a signal received at adequately distant receivers is affected differently), a key established between a pair of wireless devices using channel measurements is confidential to a third uncorrelated party (i.e., eavesdropper). Thus, the resulting keys are secure and have an advantage over crypto keys whose security strength depends on the intractability of certain mathematical setups. Earliest efforts on PHY-layer secret key generation were reported in [15] - [17] . To facilitate the key establishment, mutual information was considered as a metric to assess the overall performance. In addition, fundamental bounds on the key generation rate (KGR) were studied. The results showed that the KGR is upper bounded by the mutual information between the signal envelopes detected at Alice and Bob.
It is well-known that wireless channels are described as multipath environment with the following properties: Reciprocity: At a given time instance, channel characteristics (e.g., amplitude, phase difference, and delays) are identical at both directions of the link [18] . Spatial variations: Radiometric properties with respect to a given location are distinctive. In other words, each legitimate party experiences unique characteristics, implying that an eavesdropper at a distance greater than half a wavelength from an authentic user practices uncorrelated measurements. Temporal variations: Fading is random over time due to the movements of entities and communicating parties themselves. The randomness caused by such an unpredictable movement can be used as a source for secrecy if the legitimate parties have correlated estimates of the channel. It is paramount to point out that fading at two time points is independent if the interval between their channel estimation is larger than the channel coherence time. Furthermore, if the forward and reverse channels are not reciprocal, correlation of estimations at two parties could be affected.
By exploiting such properties, multipath channels were utilized as a source of randomness to generate reliable secret keys with reasonable computational overhead and rapid bits extraction [19] - [36] . In such studies, the statistics of a wireless channel (e.g., propagating signals amplitude and phase) were used to extract secret bits between node pairs. Received signal strength (RSS), for example, is the most widely used parameter due to the feasibility such a radiometric offers even with the traditional off-the-shelf wireless devices. Most of the reported PLS techniques in literature, however, assumed channel reciprocity between legitimate pairs [14, and references therein] . Nevertheless, such assumption does not hold in practice as the channel additive noise is asymmetric, especially in dynamic environments. Moreover, most of the wireless devices operate in a half-duplex mode. Therefore, legitimate users measure the channel at different time instants. Also, hardware noises are independent and cannot be avoided. Hence, received signals at each node are not identically affected [13] .
In this paper, a theoretical bound on the KGR in a setup that utilizes fading level crossings to generate secret keys is derived and supported by a simulation platform. Our derivation is based on the level crossing rate (LCR) in Nakagamim fading environment where reciprocity is not assumed. To facilitate the analysis, we build a protocol to extract secret keys between two nodes communicating over a wireless channel that incurs multipath fading as well as asymmetric additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). The fading effect is generated according to Nakagami-m fading model developed based on the sum-of-sinusoids approach [37] . The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, previous efforts are summarized and discussed; whereas in Section III, theoretical derivation of the reciprocity degree under asymmetric AWGN is demonstrated. In Section IV, Nakagami-m and system simulation models, as well as the protocol used to extract secret keys between two end users are illustrated. Finally, conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
PLS research has three main directions: 1) Keyless information hiding using error-control codes [12, and references therein], 2) PHY-key generation [13, and references therein], and 3) PHY-authentication [38] - [41] . In this section, related work in the area of PHY-key generation is discussed. A scheme for generating secret bits from correlated observations of deep fades by two users communicating via a time division duplex (TDD) link was proposed in [19] . However, a proper quantification of the KGR versus the parameters adjoined with the fading process or involved within the suggested algorithm was not provided. The concept of deep fades was also applied in [20] and [21] , in which a twolevel quantizer was utilized to generate a shared key between two communicating nodes. Nonetheless, a low KGR was obtained due to discarding measurements not complying with the binary quantization levels as well as the limited LCR of the adopted Rayleigh fading channel model. Enhanced RSS-based KGR by applying antenna diversity was investigated in [30] . Two nodes, A and B, were assumed to have three transmitting/receiving antennas A 1 , A 2 , A 3 and B 1 , B 2 , B 3 , respectively. As a result of this arrangement, nine uncorrelated sets of RSS measurements; due to data exchange between antenna sets (A 1 B 1 , A 1 B 2 , ..., A 3 B 3 ) enhanced the channel randomness. Moreover, according to the available mutual information (entropy taken as a measure), multilevel quantization was adopted to enhance the KGR four times as compared to a single antenna scenario. In [33] , Patwari et al. studied the effect of non-simultaneous channel measuring (i.e., reciprocity is no longer maintained), and applied fractional interpolation to recover reciprocity. In the proposed interpolation technique, nodes sample the channel at a rate higher than the Nyquist frequency to estimate what measurements one would get if they were measured simultaneously. Consequently, data-sets obtained by each node were highly correlated due to the virtually high measurements rate, and a discrete Karhunen-Loeve transform (KLT) was applied to remove the resulting correlation. Then, multiple-bit adaptive quantization was incorporated by uniformly dividing the RSS range into quantization bins based on the distribution of the measurements to improve key randomness and rate. Premnath et al. [35] proposed adaptive bit quantization at which RSS measurements were divided into smaller blocks each with its own thresholds ±q. RSS above +q or below −q were directly considered in bits extraction, whereas dropped measurements were given indices. The two endpoints exchange their list of dropped RSS estimates and keep those they both decide not to drop. The authors also investigated different real-time measured communication scenarios and showed how each scenario affects the reciprocity and inherent entropy. Secret key extraction in a more challenging wireless link (i.e., vehicular environment) was firstly proposed in [31] . To cope with the increased noise level produced by the continuously moving nodes, weighted sliding window smoothing was adopted. The different weights were optimized considering maximizing the correlation coefficient of the resulting bit sequences (gathered after level-crossing quantization at the two nodes). Correlation maximization was solved by adopting a canonical correlation analysis [42] . Then, a Markov chain was utilized to model the dependency of the quantized bits and used to estimate the entropy [43] . RSS-based collaborative key extraction algorithms for a group of wireless devices were proposed in [27] . Two connectivity topologies; specifically, star and chain, were investigated. The sole of such algorithms was to share the measurements of a specific two-node link between all nodes to extract the same key. However, the KGR significantly decreases with the increase of the network size as all participating nodes should measure RSS data within the coherence time of the channel. In [44] - [46] , the effectiveness of using highly reconfigurable antennas was studied to generate varying channel fadings which were used to establish secret keys. In [47] , a framework was introduced where fully-autonomous low-power nodes were placed upon the human body for RSS-based secret key generation between two moving legitimate parties in the presence of a stationary eavesdropper. The quality of the key was validated based on indoor and outdoor measurements. Correlation, entropy and mutual information of RSS streams were used to analyze the key generation process. In [48] , a system that incorporates the moving average techniques before the quantization process was proposed to improve adaptability to the low variation of RSS, and modify the level crossing algorithm to improve KGR value. However, the resulting key disagreement rate was high. For a recent survey on PHY-key generation works, we refer the reader to [13, and references therein].
As mentioned earlier in Section I, most of the reported PHY-key generation techniques assumed channel reciprocity between legitimate pairs, an assumption that does not hold in practice. Channel non-reciprocity, in general, can be quantified by estimating the asymmetric impairments added to the signal at the legitimate nodes (e.g., using cross-correlation analysis). Once such impairments are quantified, reciprocity calibration can be realized [33] , [49] - [52] . However, in this contribution, we introduce a thorough probabilistic reciprocity analysis based on an information-theoretic approach, giving rise to a rigorous mathematical treatment. The proposed approach can be adopted whether the association between two random signals is linear (as in the case of cross-correlation) or non-linear. Moreover, our informationtheoretic-driven analysis allows for modeling the channel reciprocity even if the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) at Alice and Bob is unavailable. Our theoretical platform is derived under practical assumptions, and unlike previous works which used mutual information as a bound on the KGR, the proposed analysis adopts the LCR in a Nakagami-m fading environment.
III. RECIPROCITY DEGREE AND KGR DERIVATION
In this section, a mathematical framework for reciprocity degree in a Nakagami-m fading channel model and asymmetric AWGN is derived. Reciprocity degree and LCR are then used to characterize the KGR. For an added convenience, the key symbols and their corresponding notations are summarized in Table 3 (Appendix A).
Based on the nature of the propagation environment, various statistical models are used to characterize the random behavior of the multipath fading channel (e.g., Rayleigh, Rician, Hoyt, and Nakagami-m) [53] . The Nakagami-m fading model is considered as the most comprehensive model [54] . According to this model, the probability density function (PDF) of a received signal envelope is described as:
where m is the Nakagami parameter that characterizes fading severity, (m) is the Gamma function, and
is the average power. This gamma distribution-based PDF was proposed to describe experimental data as compared to the Rayleigh fading model that fails to accurately predict wireless environments where long distance and high-frequency transmissions exist. It was later shown by independent experimental studies [55] , [56] that Nakagami-m model provides better characterization for less and more severe fading conditions than Rayleigh and Rician models and provides a better fit to the mobile communication data channel in diverse multipath propagation [57] , [58] . As a result, it finds applications in many software and hardware fading channel simulators [59] , [60] . It is also of interest to remark that Nakagami-m fading model is featured with universality in classifying wireless channels based on fading severity (represented by m) [37] , [54] , [61] . That is, it explicitly includes other distributions as special cases. For example, a one-sided Gaussian distribution (the most severe fading scenario) corresponds to m = 1/2, whereas m = 1 represents a Rayleigh distribution, and a one-to-one mapping between the Rician factor k and m is obtained for m > 1, which allows a close approximate of the Rician distribution. Such facts have motivated us to use Nakagami-m model as the basis for our mathematical and simulation analysis. The received signal in a multipath environment at the channel output can be represented as:
where u{+1, −1} is the input signal, n is AWGN with zero mean and variance σ 2 , and h expresses the fading gain of the channel. Reciprocity can be derived by calculating the conditional probability density function:
where f (y|x, u) = f (y|x) due to the fact that u, x, and y form a Markov chain, while p(u) denotes the probability of the occurrence of u. Since uh = x:
where U (.) is the unit step function. Furthermore, we have:
Hence:
where α = (m + 1/2σ 2 ), by applying the integral solution provided in [62, eq.(3.462.1)], f Y (y|u = 1) is found as: 
From (4a) and (4b), f Y (y|u) in a Nakagami-m fading channel can be expressed as:
For the case of a Rayleigh fading channel (m = 1):
where Q(.) is the tail of the Gaussian distribution. Then:
It can be seen that f Y (y|u) obtained in (7) complies with the results in [63] , where a Rayleigh fading model was used. To maintain reciprocity over a Nakagami-m fading channel,
which leads to the following reciprocity conditions (refer to Appendix B for proof):
where β ij = 2mσ 2 ij + 1. Thus, it can be concluded from (9a) and (9b) that channel reciprocity is a function of the Gaussian noise variance σ 2 and the fading strength m. This is to say; perfect reciprocity is not maintained if the noise variances of the forward channel σ 2 AB and reverse channel σ 2 BA are not identical (assuming the same fading severity in both directions). Hence, we characterize such a remark in the reciprocity degree R as follows:
where r ∈ (0, 1) is a function of (9a, 9b) and is given by:
Reciprocity degree R is analytically depicted in Fig. 1 , as a function of the Nakagami fading parameter m for various asymmetric additive noise conditions. As can be noticed, reciprocity degrades as the difference between σ AB and σ BA becomes larger; whereas higher values of m (i.e., less fading severity) has a positive impact on reciprocity. The Nakagami parameter m can also be written as a function of the separation distance d between Alice and Bob [64, Table 3 ]:
Hence, for a given scenario, the effect of the separation distance d on channel reciprocity can be obtained. As shown in Fig. 2 , as d increases, reciprocity decreases mainly due to the increase of the fading gain. As mentioned earlier, since fading at Bob's and Alice's locations decorrelates at Eve's who is at a distance in the order of half a wavelength, Bob and Alice can rely on the commonalities introduced by level crossings as a source of secrecy. Table 3 ].
Therefore, a bound on the KGR based on the randomness of the fading level is derived using the LCR. The LCR for a Nakagami-m fading process is given as [65] :
where ρ is the threshold level normalized to the root mean square signal level and f m represents the maximum Doppler shift, which equals to [66] :
v t and v r are the transmitter and receiver velocities magnitudes, respectively, and λ is the wavelength. Given that Alice's and Bob's observations of identical level crossing excursions are affected by how much the channel is reciprocal, an upper bound on KGR can then be calculated as:
If the channel is reciprocal (i.e., r = 0) and ρ = 1, it can be inferred that the maximum key size will not exceed the maximum Doppler shift f m . In other words, it is not possible to obtain key bits per second larger than f m even with optimally designed key generation protocol.
IV. SIMULATION MODEL
To evaluate the effect of non-reciprocity on the KGR, simulations are performed based on the system model shown in Fig. 3 . Two communication parties, Alice and Bob, try to generate secret keys over a wireless channel that incurs multipath fading as well as asymmetric AWGN. Here, h is a stochastic process that represents a time-varying channel parameter. Asymmetric AWGN in the forward and reverse channels is represented by n AB (t), n BA (t), respectively. Alice and Bob generate keys by estimating the channel coefficient h through exchanging known probes u within a time frame smaller than the channel coherence time T c . To simulate the channel coefficient h, various approaches are used in the literature. The most commonly used one is the filtering white Gaussian variables method [20] , [21] , [63] , [67] - [72] . However, this method does not take into account the variation of the number of paths or Doppler shift, which are important parameters to characterize various fading conditions. In this paper, instead, we use the sum-ofsinusoids method for its flexibility and parametric inclusivity in characterizing various fading conditions [73] - [76] . The adopted method allows the approximation of multipath fading through the superposition of a finite number of weighted harmonic components. Each component represents one path and is described by amplitude, frequency, and phase values related to the Doppler frequency f m .
A. SUM-OF-SINUSOIDS NAKAGAMI-M MODEL
While a fair amount of attention has been given to the Nakagami-m distribution, relatively less work has addressed the issue of Nakagami-m channel model simulation. This can be attributed to the fact that such a model was not specified when Nakagami-m distribution was first proposed [77] . Directly generating a Nakagami-m envelope is difficult and, therefore, mostly indirect approaches are used. According to [37] , a Nakagami envelope can be generated from Rayleigh and Rician envelopes as follows:
To this end, Rayleigh and Rician models are implemented individually and then combined together to introduce a Nakagami-m multipath model. The random process of Rayleigh fading with N paths can be simulated with the sumof-sinusoid method described as [76] and [77] :
where N is the total number of the paths. θ n (angle of arrival) and φ n (phase delay) are statistically independent and uniformly distributed random variables over [−π, π].The maximum angular Doppler shift is denoted by w m . The presentation of [76] and [77] can also be extended to establish a Rician fading model. Given that a dominant line-of-sight (LOS) component exists, the normalized Rician fading process of an improved sum-of-sinusoids statistical simulation model is described as:
where Y c (t) and Y s (t) are the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) rays that can be obtained from (14b,c). θ 0 = π/4 is the angle of arrival of the LOS component [75] , [76] . The Rician factor k represents the ratio of the specular to scattered power, and has the one-to-one mapping with m as [61] :
A validation of the fading model is carried out through Monte-Carlo simulation by sending a binary phase-shiftkeying (BPSK) signal over the multipath fading channel. Simulation parameters are set in Table 1 . Fig . 4 shows the simulated PDF of the signal envelope considering two fading parameter m values; specifically, m = 4, m = 1 (Rayleigh), compared to the theoretical distributions. The close agreement between both simulated and analytical PDFs justifies the use of the sum-of-sinusoids method in the channel implementation. Fig. 5 shows the fundamental process for extracting PHY-based secret keys from level crossings [20] . Such a process incorporates three main stages: probing, quantization, and converting excursions to bits. In this paper, each stage is elaborated in greater details. Probing: In the system model given in Fig. 3 , two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, exchange probing signals u (known to each other) within a certain time frame to gather RSS values affected, naturally, by small-scale fading and AWGN. Theoretically, and based on the reciprocity concept, RSS values measured at Bob (by sensing Alice's transmitted probes) match the ones measured at Alice (by sensing Bob's transmitted probes). This, however, is not the case in practice due to 1) asymmetric additive noise, 2) transmitter/receiver hardware differences, and 3) non-simultaneous measuring attempts because of the half-duplex nature in most wireless networks. The context of this work is devoted for addressing the first effect on reciprocity; i.e., asymmetric additive noise. In our system model, Alice and Bob exchange their probes across a multipath environment characterized by Nakagami-m fading model. Therefore, received signals at both parties:
B. LCR QUANTIZER
where Alice receives y BA and Bob receives y AB . During each probe exchange, each party can use the received signal y along with the probe signal u to compute one channel estimateĥ. Since Alice and Bob know the original probe signal u, they both can estimate a version of the channel coefficient h(t) scaled by additive noise Z (t) [78] :
where Alice estimatesĥ BA and Bob estimatesĥ AB ; whereas Z BA (t) and Z AB (t) are asymmetric additive noise processes at Alice and Bob, respectively. By repeatedly exchanging probes over the channel, Alice and Bob can generate a sequence of channel estimates E. That is, Bob generateŝ
Since asymmetric variations could be added at Alice's and Bob's sides, reciprocity cannot be maintained and, therefore, the correlation between H BA andĤ AB could be affected. In [20] , [21] , and [48] , in order to mitigate the non-simultaneous measurements limitation of half-duplex transceivers and achieve high correlation betweenĤ BA andĤ AB , it was assumed that Alice and Bob exchange their probes at a faster rate. However, a decorrelation betweenĤ BA andĤ AB could result from the asymmetric additive noise, as will be discussed later. Quantization: After Alice and Bob collect their estimations of the channel coefficients, they use a two-level quantizer to detect excursions that exceed a threshold, ±q. We define an excursion as a channel estimate inĤ BA orĤ AB that exceeds the threshold ±q. This quantization approach was originally proposed in [20] and was also adopted in [21] and [48] . The quantizer threshold depends on the channel statistics (i.e, mean µ H and standard deviation σ H of the channel estimates) as follows:
where ±q A and ±q B are the quantizer threshold levels at Alice and Bob, respectively, i = 1, 2, ..., E, and ξ is a tuning parameter that takes any value between {0.1 − 0.8}. A high ξ gives a strict quantizer that results in a smaller key size, but at the same time, reduces the chance of Eve having similar excursions, and vice versa. Once Alice and Bob determine such a threshold, Alice searchesĤ BA to obtain the locations of existing excursions, and put them in a vector L A . To increase the probability of having identical sequences of bits, later, generated at the two parties, Alice considers the location of an excursion only if that excursion occurs S m successive times. S m is a tuning parameter that takes integer values between {2 − 5}, and has two main benefits: 1) it functions analogous to repetition codes (i.e., sending a message repeatedly to reduce the error probability through majority decoding [79] ), and 2) it guarantees that only one key bit is generated from a subset of successive channel estimates that exceed ±q. Accordingly, Alice searchesĤ BA to find subsets with exactly S m successive similar excursions, where an entire subset is used to generate only one key bit. While the LCR quantizer reported in [20] enables Alice to adopt subsets that have S m or more successive excursions, ours enforces Alice to searchĤ BA and find subsets that have exactly S m successive excursions. Our use of a more realistic fading model justifies this modification. Furthermore, in [20] , it was assumed that the fading process h(t) is a Gaussian random variable, which does not accurately model the correlation between successive estimates in realistic scenarios. However, in a more realistic fading model where temporal variation between these estimates exists, decorrelation between different subsets of channel estimates exist and is dictated by the channel coherence time T c . For example, a channel with f m = 100 Hz has a coherence time T c of 4.23 × 10 −3 seconds. Therefore, within one T c period and a probing rate of 1Kprobe/s, Alice and Bob have enough window to exchange two probes each, as shown in Fig. 6 . As such, every two successive channel estimates have a high correlation in this window. Therefore, setting S m = 2 is more practical than S m ≥ 2. Excursions-to-Bits Extraction: Alice sends Bob a vector L A , which has the excursions locations, over the 
Finally, given the vector L B at both sides, and based on the threshold ±q, a binary 1 is generated if the value of an excursion is greater than +q; whereas a binary 0 is generated if the value of an excursion is less than −q. In other words:
Simulations are performed based on the system model shown in Fig. 3 , where the effect of asymmetric AWGN (i.e., non-reciprocity) on the KGR is demonstrated. The design parameters are subdivided into two main categories: 1) channel parameters; specifically, the fading parameter m, maximum Doppler frequency f m , number of paths N , and the variance (i.e., power) of the additive noise σ 2 , 2) LCR quantizer parameters; specifically, the tuning parameter ξ (that controls ±q), and S m . Simulations are performed in five different scenarios, and the KGR is measured over a period of 50 sec. Simulation parameters for all scenarios are summarized in Table 2 . It is worth mentioning that the number of paths N and the rate at which Alice and Bob probe each other are fixed at 100 and 1Kprobe/sec, respectively. As mentioned earlier, reciprocity degrades when there is a difference between σ 2 AB and σ 2 BA and/or a high fading gain. To validate the former effect on the KGR, the variance of the AWGN in the forward channel (i.e., σ 2 AB ) is set to 1; whereas the variance of the reverse channel (i.e., σ 2 BA ) is changed by varying σ BA in the range {1−5}. f m , m, and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) are set to 200 Hz, 4, and 10 dB, respectively. Such values are chosen under the assumption that two vehicular nodes are communicating at 2.4 GHz carrier frequency. The LCR quantizer parameters are set to ξ = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and S m = 2. Fig. 7 shows that a larger difference between σ 2 AB and σ 2 BA induces a noticeable decrease in the KGR due to the decrease in reciprocity degree. Specifically, each unit increase in σ BA reduces the KGR by 14%. Furthermore, it can be seen that smaller key sizes are obtained for higher ξ values as fewer excursions are considered due to the larger ±q magnitudes. KGR analysis under different fading gains is illustrated by varying m in the range {1 − 5}, while fixing f m to 100 Hz and SNR to 10 dB. The LCR quantizer parameters are set to ξ = 0.8 and S m = 2. Fig. 8 shows that higher values of m (i.e., less fading severity) result in a higher KGR. This can be attributed to the fact that higher m values result in a better channel reciprocity degree R.
It is paramount to point out that a simple two-level quantizer design could result in a high mismatch rate (i.e., Alice and Bob may agree on index values with excursions lying in opposite directions). Such a mismatch is overcome by using key distillation and privacy amplification techniques [80] , [81] which are beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, as discussed in Section IV.B, the mismatch rate can be reduced by considering S m successive (rather than single) excursions. However, S m can be increased to a certain limit as having similar excursions will also become less frequent due to the temporal variation between successive estimations. With a probing rate of 1Kprobe/s and a channel coherence time T c of 4.23ms, Alice and Bob have enough window to exchange two probes each. In this case, higher S m values (i.e., S m > 2), as shown in Fig. 9 , result in a lower KGR. Fig. 10 shows the effect of the Doppler frequency f m on the KGR. Higher f m values (i.e., increased nodes' velocity) increases the KGR as the likelihood of having more excursions increases. However, as predicted by (12c), the KGR is capped by f m (simulation parameters are set to m = 4, SNR = 10 dB, ξ = 0.8, and S m = 2). Finally, Fig. 11 shows a proportional relation between the SNR and the KGR, as higher SNR values impose low noise power (i.e. higher reciprocity). 
V. CONCLUSION
We derived and validated a PLS scheme to assess the maximum achievable KGR under practical assumptions. VOLUME 6, 2018 A theoretical bound on the KGR in a setup that utilizes level crossings to generate secret keys is derived and validated by simulations. Our derivation can characterize the effect of nonperfect reciprocity due to asymmetric AWGN on the KGR. Unlike many previous works that used the mutual information as a bound, the LCR in a fading environment characterized by Nakagami-m fading model is adopted, where reciprocity is not assumed. Since Nakagami-m fading model demonstrates better approximations to realistic wireless channels as well as the universality it offers in characterizing these channels, based on fading severity, the proposed analytical and simulation frameworks enable a practical PLS scheme. To facilitate the analysis of non-perfect reciprocity of the channel on the KGR, secret keys between two nodes communicating over a wireless channel that incurs multipath and asymmetric AWGN are extracted. The Nakagami-m fading process is generated using the sum-of-sinusoids approach to provide a flexibility in characterizing various fading conditions, through varying the number of paths as well as the maximum Doppler frequency. Analytical and simulation results show that differences in noise power between the forward/reverse channels decreases the KGR as channel reciprocity is not maintained. While, higher m values (i.e., less fading severity) result in a higher KGR as channel reciprocity is improved. 
APPENDIX B
Considering the LHS of (8):
where β ij = 2mσ ij + 1. Furthermore, we also have the following approximation:
is defined as the confluent hypergeometric function of the first kind:
where (n) k is the Pochhammer symbol. Considering the first two terms of (B.III) and (B.II) in (B.I) yields to:
BA β BA Utilizing the approximation 1 + x = e x leads to:
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